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MISUSE OF INFORMATION UNDER THE COMPUTER FRAUD 
AND ABUSE ACT: ON WHAT SIDE OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
WILL THE SECOND AND THIRD CIRCUITS WIND UP? 
Dresser-Rand Co. v. Jones, 957 F. Supp. 2d 610 (E.D. Pa. 2013) 
JBCHoldings NY, LLC v. Pakter, 931 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
Robert D. Sowell* 
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) has reached a breaking 
point. The much-discussed issue is whether the CFAA provides a cause of 
action against persons who use electronic information in a way that 
violates a relevant computer-use policy.1 Four circuit courts of appeals 
have held that the CFAA provides a cause of action for misuses of 
information, while two have disagreed.2 In two undecided circuits, the 
district courts have favored the latter interpretation.3 As the Supreme Court 
recently refused to address the issue,4 these two undecided circuits will 
play a pivotal role in determining the direction of the CFAA. 
By way of background, in 1984, the Ninety-Eighth Congress enacted 
the Comprehensive Crime Control Act (CCCA).5 In § 2102 of the CCCA, 
Congress included the Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act, which was codified in § 1030 of Title 18 of the United States 
Code.6 Shortly thereafter, Congress substantially amended § 1030 by way 
of the CFAA.7 At that time, the CFAA focused primarily on criminalizing 
computer hacking.8 Presently, the CFAA provides criminal9 and civil 
liability10 in § 1030(a)(2) for “[w]hoever . . . intentionally accesses a 
                                                                                                                     
 * J.D. 2014, University of Florida Levin College of Law. 
 1. See generally Audra A. Dial & John M. Moye, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and 
Disloyal Employees: How Far Should the Statute Go to Protect Employers from Trade Secret 
Theft?, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1447, 1451–62 (2013) (discussing the background related to whether the 
CFAA reaches information misuses); Lee Goldman, Interpreting the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act, PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y, Fall 2012, at 1, 5–14 (discussing the issue of interpreting the CFAA 
as well as judicial approaches to resolving that issue); Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1572, 1583–87 (2010) (discussing 
interpretation of the CFAA and its relation to the void for vagueness doctrine). 
 2. See infra notes 13–16 and accompanying text. 
 3. See infra text accompanying notes 92, 106. 
 4. WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 133 S. Ct. 831, 831 (2013) (denying 
certiorari). 
 5. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976. 
 6. Id. § 2102(a), 98 Stat. at 2190–92.  
 7. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, § 2, 100 Stat. 1213, 1213–
16. 
 8. See infra text accompanying notes 131–32. 
 9. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (2012) (“Whoever—[listing acts under the CFAA] . . . shall be 
punished as provided in . . . this section.”). 
 10. Id. § 1030(g) (providing a private right of action). 
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computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access.”11 In 
§ 1030(a)(4), the CFAA reaches “[w]hoever . . . knowingly and with intent 
to defraud, accesses a protected computer without authorization, or 
exceeds authorized access.”12 These two phrases, “without authorization” 
and “exceeds authorized access,” are the crux of a major circuit split 
concerning whether the CFAA provides a cause of action against 
individuals who violate computer-use policies. Adhering to a “broad 
interpretation,”13 some circuits have interpreted § 1030 to cover violations 
of use policies.14 In contrast, following a “narrow interpretation,”15 others 
have held that § 1030 deals only with “access” and does not provide a 
cause of action for violations of use policies.16 
In practice, the question is frequently presented as whether an 
employee, previously given authorization to access an employer’s 
computer, accesses “without authorization” or “exceeds authorized access” 
if that employee accesses an employer’s computer for a wrongful purpose 
or misuses data after having logged on.17 Fortunately, the CFAA provides 
some guidance by defining “exceeds authorized access” as “to access a 
computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter 
information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or 
alter.”18 However, the statute fails to define “without authorization.” 
Recently, two district courts addressed whether the CFAA reaches 
misuses of information.19 Notably, neither of the district courts’ respective 
circuit courts of appeals, the Second and Third Circuits, have addressed the 
issue.20 An obvious question is whether the Second and Third Circuits will 
                                                                                                                     
 11. Id. § 1030(a)(2). 
 12. Id. § 1030(a)(4). Additionally, § 1030(a)(1) also uses both the “without authorization” 
and “exceed[s] authorized access” language.  
 13. See Dresser-Rand Co. v. Jones, 957 F. Supp. 2d 610, 615–16 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (labeling 
the competing interpretations as the “broad view” and the “narrow view”); id. passim (using the 
terms “broad interpretation” and “narrow interpretation”). 
 14. See United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
John, 597 F.3d 263, 272 (5th Cir. 2010); Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420–21 
(7th Cir. 2006); EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 583–84 (1st Cir. 2001). 
 15. See source cited supra note 13. 
 16. See WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 207 (4th Cir. 2012); 
United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
 17. See Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in 
Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1632–40 (2003) (discussing the CFAA’s 
application “in the context of employee misconduct” and in cases of breaches of “contracts 
governing the use of computers”). 
 18. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) (2012). 
 19. See Dresser-Rand Co. v. Jones, 957 F. Supp. 2d 610, 614–21 (E.D. Pa. 2013); 
JBCHoldings NY, LLC v. Pakter, 931 F. Supp. 2d 514, 520–25 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 20. Dresser-Rand Co., 957 F. Supp. 2d at 616; JBCHoldings NY, LLC, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 
522. 
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decide the issue in the near future.21 Another question is whether the 
Second and Third Circuits will interpret the CFAA narrowly or broadly. 
This Comment begins by discussing the relevant facts from each district 
court case. Next, this Comment delves into the circuit split and focuses on 
the reasoning behind the competing views. Finally, this Comment 
discusses the analysis in the district court opinions and explains why the 
district courts reached the correct result. 
In the Second Circuit, the Southern District of New York grappled with 
the issue in March of 2013.22 In JBCHoldings NY, LLC v. Pakter, a holding 
company acquired an executive search firm.23 In doing so, the holding 
company employed a former owner of the acquired firm, and the former 
owner signed an employment agreement with the holding company.24 
According to the agreement, the former owner agreed “to help [the holding 
company] build [its] executive search business.”25 The employment 
agreement also provided that the former owner, as well as an additional 
owner of the search firm, would not compete with the holding company.26 
Approximately six months after the former owner began working for 
the holding company, management for the holding company discovered 
personal e-mails of the former owner on a company computer.27 The e-
mails suggested that the former owner was directly competing with the 
holding company.28 Specifically, according to the holding company, the 
former owner and several coconspirators “misappropriated .  . . proprietary 
information, including client lists, and used these to advance their 
competing business.”29 The holding company theorized that the former 
owner “obtained this information either by (1) copying it to her personal 
laptop and sharing it with her co-[conspirators]; (2) lifting it from [the 
                                                                                                                     
 21. The Second Circuit may, in fact, decide the issue soon. On January 24, 2014, Judge 
Covello of the District of Connecticut, in the Second Circuit, held that there was no cause of action 
under the CFAA against a former employee that downloaded confidential information in violation 
of the employer’s computer-use policy. Amphenol Corp. v. Paul, Civil No. 3:12-cv-00543-AVC, 
2014 WL 272337, at *8–9 (D. Conn. Jan. 24, 2014). On February 20, 2014, the employer filed a 
notice of appeal regarding Judge Covello’s January 24th order. Notice of Appeal at 1, Amphenol 
Corp., Civil No. 3:12-cv-00543-AVC (D. Conn. Feb. 20, 2014); see also Notice of Appeal at 1, 
Amphenol Corp., Civil No. 14-547 (2d Cir. Feb. 20, 2014). 
 22. See JBCHoldings NY, LLC, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 520–27; see also Amphenol Corp., 2014 
WL 272337, at *8–9 (addressing the issue in January 2014); Targum v. Citrin Cooperman & Co., 
No. 12 Civ. 6909(SAS), 2013 WL 6087400, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2013) (addressing the issue 
within the last year); Poller v. Bioscrip, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 1675(JPO), 2013 WL 5354753, at *22 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2013 ) (same). 
 23. JBCHoldings NY, LLC, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 518. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 519. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
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holding company’s] computers using a flash drive; and/or (3) obtaining it 
remotely via spyware.”30 The holding company filed a complaint against 
the former owner and other coconspirators, alleging violations of the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and the Lanham Act.31 Thereafter, the 
former owner, as well as the other coconspirators, moved to dismiss.32 
More recently, in the Third Circuit, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
addressed the issue in July of 2013.33 In Dresser-Rand Co. v. Jones, two 
employees worked as managers at a company that “provide[d] technology, 
product [sic] and services used for developing energy and natural 
resources.”34 At that time, several company policies governed employee 
behavior.35 One, the “Acceptable Use Policy,” provided that “[a]ny 
unauthorized use, disclosure or transmission of [protected] information or 
content [was] prohibited.”36 The “Internet Access and Usage Policy” 
defined unauthorized Internet use as “[s]ending, receiving or posting 
without authorization company-sensitive or privileged information.”37 
Each time that an employee logged onto a company computer, the 
employee was required to acknowledge a “Legal Notice and Acceptable 
Use Statement” that outlined additional computer-use rules.38 
During the course of their employment with the plaintiff, the two 
employees began working for a new employer engaged in a similar 
business.39 Before terminating their employment with the first company, 
the two employees violated computer-use policies when they downloaded 
company documents onto external hard drives, e-mailed company 
documents to their new employer, and deleted materials on company-
provided computers.40 Thereafter, the company filed a complaint against 
the two former employees for, among other claims, violations of the 
CFAA,41 and the former employees moved for partial summary judgment 
as to the CFAA claims.42 
Without guidance from the Second or Third Circuits, the Southern 
District of New York and Eastern District of Pennsylvania were left to 
their own devices in choosing which side of the circuit split to follow. On 
                                                                                                                     
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 519–20. 
 33. See Dresser-Rand Co. v. Jones, 957 F. Supp. 2d 610, 614–21 (E.D. Pa. 2013). 
 34. Id. at 611. 
 35. Id. at 612. 
 36. Id. (second alteration in original) 
 37. Id. (alteration in original). 
 38. Id. A “Code of Conduct” also covered “conflicts of interest, competition and fair dealing, 
confidentiality, privacy, protection and proper use of company assets, and other topics.” Id. 
 39. Id. at 611. 
 40. Id. at 611–12. 
 41. Id. at 611. 
 42. Id. at 611–12. 
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one side, the First, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have adhered to 
the broad interpretation and have held that violations of a computer-use 
policy can provide a basis for a CFAA cause of action.43 These decisions 
approach the issue in two ways: a contract-based theory or an agency-based 
theory.44 
The First, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits employ the contract-based theory 
whereby the breach of the policy itself triggers CFAA liability.45 In United 
States v. Rodriguez, the Social Security Administration (SSA) maintained 
electronic databases that included sensitive personal information such as 
social security numbers, addresses, dates of birth, and annual income.46 
The SSA established computer-use policies prohibiting an employee from 
accessing the database for nonbusiness reasons.47 When an SSA employee 
accessed the personal information of seventeen individuals for personal 
reasons, the employee was charged with violating the CFAA.48 The 
Eleventh Circuit determined that, according to the policy, the employee’s 
authorization to access varied depending on his purpose.49 Following a 
cursory analysis, the court held that, by violating the SSA’s computer-use 
policies, the employee “exceeded his authorized access” in violation of the 
CFAA.50 
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit interpreted the statute broadly and held that 
a bank employee “exceed[ed] authorized access” when she provided a 
relative with confidential customer account information in violation of the 
bank’s computer-use policies.51 The First Circuit, reviewing a motion for 
preliminary injunction, held that a company would “likely prove that”52 a 
former employee “exceed[ed] authorized access”53 by accessing the 
company’s website in a way that violated a confidentiality agreement 
between the company and former employee.54 
                                                                                                                     
 43. See supra note 14. 
 44. See Goldman, supra note 1, at 5–9. 
 45. See United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1263–64 (11th Cir. 2010); United States 
v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 271–73 (5th Cir. 2010); EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 
577, 583–84 (1st Cir. 2001). 
 46. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1260. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 1260, 1262. 
 49. Id. at 1263. 
 50. Id. at 1263, 1265. 
 51. United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 272–73 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 52. EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 583 (1st Cir. 2001). 
 53. Id. at 581 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 54. Id. at 581–83. In EF Cultural Travel, the former employee signed a confidentiality 
agreement with the company providing that the “[e]mployee agree[d] to maintain in strict 
confidence and not to disclose to any third party . . . any Confidential or Proprietary Information.” 
Id. at 582. In conjunction with a third party, the former employee used that confidential information 
to develop a computer program to extract proprietary pricing information from the company’s 
website. Id. at 579. The former employee would then use the extracted data to undercut the 
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In contrast, the Seventh Circuit employs an agency-law theory to justify 
a broad interpretation.55 In International Airport Centers, L.L.C. v. Citrin, 
an employee decided to terminate his employment.56 Before returning a 
company-issued laptop, the employee deleted all the data in the laptop and 
installed a “secure-erasure program” to prevent the data from being 
recovered.57 Judge Richard Posner determined that the employee accessed 
the laptop “without authorization” after acquiring an interest adverse to the 
company.58 According to this theory, the agency relationship between the 
principal-employer and agent-employee was the basis for the employee’s 
authorization to access the laptop.59 The employee breached his fiduciary 
duty to the company by resolving to quit and destroying the files within the 
laptop.60 That breach resulted in a termination of the agency relationship.61 
Thereafter, the employee accessed the laptop without authorization by 
using it after the agency relationship had ended.62 
On the other side of the circuit split, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits 
interpret the CFAA narrowly and hold that violations of computer-use 
policies do not provide a basis for a CFAA cause of action.63 In this camp, 
the Fourth Circuit recently affirmed a decision from the District of South 
Carolina that granted a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state 
a claim under the CFAA.64 In WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. 
Miller, a company provided an employee with a laptop, cell phone, and 
authorization to access “the company’s intranet and computer servers.”65 
According to the company, the employee, while working for the company, 
violated company policies by “download[ing] confidential and proprietary 
                                                                                                                     
company’s price scheme. Id. at 580. According to the court, the former employee likely “exceeded 
authorized access” “by providing proprietary information and know-how to [the third party] to 
create the [computer program].” Id. at 583. In sum, “[t]he website was open to the public, so he was 
authorized to use it, but he exceeded his authorization by using confidential information to obtain 
better access than other members of the public.” Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 
420 (7th Cir. 2006) (discussing the holding in EF Cultural Travel). 
 55. See Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420–21. The Seventh Circuit is the only circuit court of appeals 
that has employed this theory, and both the Ninth and Fourth Circuits expressly rejected the agency-
based theory. WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 206 (4th Cir. 2012); 
United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 862–63 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
 56. Citrin, 440 F.3d at 419. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 420–21. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 207 (4th Cir. 2012); 
United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
 64. WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC, 687 F.3d at 201. 
 65. Id. at 202. 
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information to a personal computer” and then using the information to 
successfully procure projects for a subsequent employer.66 
Reviewing the district court’s dismissal of the company’s CFAA 
claims, the Fourth Circuit narrowed the issue to whether an employee that 
violates a computer-use policy accesses “without authorization” or 
“exceeds authorized access.”67 The unanimous panel held that an employee 
“accesses a computer ‘without authorization’ when he gains admission to a 
computer without approval.”68 In contrast, “an employee ‘exceeds 
authorized access’ when he has approval to access a computer, but uses his 
access to obtain or alter information that falls outside the bounds of his 
approved access.”69 Applying the rule of lenity,70 the court construed the 
CFAA narrowly and held that the CFAA only addresses “individuals who 
access computers without authorization or who obtain or alter information 
beyond the bounds of their authorized access.”71 
The Fourth Circuit relied heavily on borrowed reasoning from the Ninth 
Circuit’s en banc decision in United States v. Nosal.72 In Nosal, a former 
employee solicited a company’s current employees to use “their log-in 
credentials to download source lists, names and contact information from a 
confidential database on the company’s computer, and then transfer[] that 
information to” the former employee.73 Because that conduct violated the 
company’s computer-use policies, the government charged the former 
employee with violating the CFAA.74 The former employee moved to 
dismiss, and the district court granted the motion.75 
                                                                                                                     
 66. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, the company alleged that the 
employee “downloaded a substantial number of [the company’s] confidential documents and 
emailed them to his personal e-mail address.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 67. Id. at 203. 
 68. Id. at 204. Specifically, the court defined “‘authorization’ as [a] ‘formal warrant, or 
sanction.’” Id. (citing THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 798 (2d ed. 1989)). Accordingly, “an 
employee is authorized to access a computer when his employer approves or sanctions his 
admission to that computer.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 205–06. The rule of lenity requires that ambiguous criminal statutes be strictly 
construed in favor of the criminal defendant. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997). 
Where a statute has both criminal and civil applications, the rule of lenity applies in the civil 
context as well. Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004). 
 71. WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC, 687 F.3d at 207 (emphasis added). 
 72. Id. at 203, 205. 
 73. United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 856 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
 74. Id. Specifically, the government charged the former employee with aiding and abetting 
the current employees in “‘exceed[ing their] authorized access’ with intent to defraud.” Id. 
(alteration in original). 
 75. Id. After initially denying the motion to dismiss, the district court granted the motion on 
reconsideration, following the Ninth Circuit’s decision in LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka. Id. 
Decided in 2009, Brekka is a precursor to Nosal. LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127 
(9th Cir. 2009). In Brekka, the Ninth Circuit held that there is no cause of action under the CFAA 
against an individual for sending personal e-mails containing company documents in violation of 
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The initial panel reversed.76 However, on rehearing en banc, the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed the district court.77 To begin, the court looked to the 
legislative history to determine that “without authorization” refers to 
traditional “outside hackers,” while “exceeds authorized access” covers 
“inside hackers.”78 Accordingly, inside hackers are “individuals whose 
initial access to a computer is authorized but who [thereafter] access 
unauthorized information or files.”79 The court also posited several 
extreme examples that would follow from a broad interpretation.80 One 
example was where a company’s computer-use policy prohibits using a 
company computer for personal use, an employee could call a family 
member from a work phone but could be criminally prosecuted if the 
employee instead sends an e-mail.81 Therefore, the en banc court 
interpreted the statute narrowly and held that the CFAA does not reach 
violations of computer-use policies.82 
Both Judge Paul Engelmayer of the Southern District of New York and 
Judge Anita Brody of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania were persuaded 
by the reasoning of the Fourth and Ninth Circuits.83 In JBCHoldings NY, 
LLC, the company’s CFAA cause of action hinged on a violation of an 
employment agreement between the company and the former owner of the 
acquired executive search firm.84 Judge Engelmayer determined that the 
issue was “whether an employee acts ‘without authorization’ or ‘exceeds 
authorized access’ when that employee is authorized in the first instance to 
access certain information, but then uses that information for an improper 
purpose.”85 Stated narrowly, the issue was “whether an employee’s misuse 
of an employer’s information violates the CFAA where that information 
                                                                                                                     
the company’s computer-use policy. Id. at 1135. The decision largely focused on the “without 
authorization” language and held that that language does not reach an individual’s misuse of 
information. Id. at 1132–35. 
 76. United States v. Nosal, 642 F.3d 781, 789 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 
2012) (en banc). The initial panel construed the term “so” within the definition of “exceeds 
authorized access” to mean “in that manner.” Id. at 785–86. In that sense, the CFAA would define 
‘“exceeds authorized access”’ to mean “‘to access a computer with authorization and to use such 
access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled [in that 
manner] to obtain or alter.’” Id. at 785 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) (2012)). According to the 
panel, by qualifying the way in which an individual accesses a computer, the CFAA reaches 
violations of computer-use policies. Id. at 786. 
 77. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 864. 
 78. Id. at 858. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 860. 
 81. Id. As another example, an employee could surreptitiously read a newspaper at work but 
would risk criminal sanctions if the employee instead visited a news website. Id. 
 82. Id. at 863–64. 
 83. See JBCHoldings NY, LLC v. Pakter, 931 F. Supp. 2d 514, 522–23 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); 
Dresser-Rand Co. v. Jones, 957 F. Supp. 2d 610, 616–18 (E.D. Pa. 2013). 
 84. See supra text accompanying notes 22–32. 
 85. JBCHoldings NY, LLC, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 521. 
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was obtained from a computer to which the employee was permitted 
access.”86 
After briefly outlining the circuit split, the court noted that, even within 
the Southern District of New York, interpretations of the CFAA varied.87 
As to the text, the court distinguished between access and use.88 In that 
vein, the court concluded that authorization to access cannot vary 
depending on one’s purpose.89 Rather, should an individual violate a policy 
after having permissibly accessed a computer, that conduct would simply 
be a misuse of that information.90 Summarily stated, “[a]n employee acts 
‘without authorization’ when he accesses a computer without permission to 
do so; an employee ‘exceeds authorized access’ when he has permission to 
access certain information on a computer, but accesses other information 
as to which he lacks permission.”91 Therefore, consistent with the narrow 
interpretation, the court held that the CFAA does not cover violations of 
computer-use policies.92 
While the court explicitly refused to declare the statute ambiguous, it 
did note that even if the statute were ambiguous, the rule of lenity would 
necessitate the same narrow construction.93 To be sure, “if Congress seeks 
to make a federal crime out of an employee’s misuse of his work computer, 
it is required to say so clearly.”94 
Addressing the motion to dismiss, the court turned to the amended 
complaint.95 According to the allegations therein, the former owner 
                                                                                                                     
 86. Id.  
 87. Id. at 522. Specifically, the court cited four decisions interpreting the CFAA narrowly. Id. 
(citing Advanced Aerofoil Techs., AG v. Todaro, No. 11 Civ. 9505(ALC)(DCF), 2013 WL 410873, 
at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2013); United States v. Aleynikov, 737 F. Supp. 2d 173, 190–94 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010); Orbit One Commc’ns, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 692 F. Supp. 2d 373, 384–86 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010); Univ. Sports Publ’ns Co. v. Playmakers Media Co., 725 F. Supp. 2d 378, 383–84 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010)). In contrast, the court cited three other decisions within the Southern District of New York 
interpreting the CFAA broadly. Id. (citing Mktg. Tech. Solutions, Inc. v. Medizine LLC, No. 09 
Civ. 8122(LMM), 2010 WL 2034404, at *6–7 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2010); Calyon v. Mizuho Sec. 
USA, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 2241(RO), 2007 WL 2618658, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2007); 
Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 252–53 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d as modified, 
356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004)). 
 88. Id. at 522–23. 
 89. Id. at 523. According to the court, to allow “authorization” to vary depending on one’s 
purpose would impose a subjective element into the CFAA that was not intended by the enacting 
Congress. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 523, 525 (concluding that the CFAA does not address “the circumstance where an 
employee has permission to access certain information and then uses that information for an 
improper purpose” and that Congress did not intend the CFAA to expand federal jurisdiction over 
such acts). 
 93. Id. at 524. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 525. 
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acquired the holding company’s “client lists and other proprietary 
information and used that information to set up a competing enterprise,” in 
violation of the holding company’s “electronic media policy.”96 Applying a 
narrow interpretation, the court noted that the amended complaint did not 
allege that the former owner “lacked the authority to access th[e] 
information.”97 Accordingly, the holding company failed to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted.98 Specifically, “such misuse does not 
state a claim under the CFAA, because an employee does not ‘exceed[] 
authorized access’ or act ‘without authorization’ when she misuses 
information to which she otherwise had access.”99 
In Dresser-Rand Co., the company’s CFAA claim centered on two 
employees’ violations of several computer-use polices.100 Judge Brody 
began her analysis with a discussion of the legislative history of the 
CFAA.101 Particularly, the court cited a pre-CFAA committee report that 
discussed § 1030 as addressing “breaking and entering” or trespass-type 
crimes.102 Notably, that type of conduct has little to do with misuse; it has 
everything to do with access or hacking. Aside from the legislative history, 
the court narrowed its focus to whether the two employees “exceed[ed] 
authorized access” when they violated the company’s computer-use 
policies.103 As to the text, the court relied almost exclusively on the Fourth 
and Ninth Circuits in reasoning that the plain meaning of the CFAA and 
the rule of lenity104 necessitate a narrow interpretation.105 The court then 
rejected the opposing case law as “wrap[ping] the intent of the employees 
and use of the information into the CFAA despite the fact that the statute 
narrowly governs access, not use.”106 
Applying the narrow interpretation, the court noted that the company 
had provided the two employees with “user names and passwords to 
                                                                                                                     
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. (alteration in original). The court did note that the amended complaint included 
allegations that “someone . . . placed a flash memory drive on [the holding company’s] computer 
servers . . . in an effort to surreptitiously rip information from the drives.” Id. at 525–26 (ellipsis in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Had those allegations been pleaded with the requisite 
specificity, then those allegations may have sufficed to state a claim under the CFAA. Id. 
 100. Dresser-Rand Co. v. Jones, 957 F. Supp. 2d 610, 611–12 (E.D. Pa. 2013). 
 101. Id. 613–14. 
 102. Id. at 613 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 20 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 103. Id. at 615 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 104. Generally, before the rule of lenity applies, the court must declare that the statute is 
ambiguous. LINDA D. JELLUM & DAVID CHARLES HRICIK, MODERN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 151 
(2d ed. 2009) (noting that the rule of lenity “is generally applied only when the statute at issue is 
both penal in nature and ambiguous” (emphasis added to last word)); see also id. at 476–77 
(discussing the relationship between ambiguity and the rule of lenity). 
 105. Dresser-Rand Co., 957 F. Supp. 2d at 615–19. 
 106. Id. at 619 (emphasis added). 
10
Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 7
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss4/7
2014] CASE COMMENT 1757 
 
access” the company’s network and database.107 Additionally, the company 
provided the employees with laptops.108 According to the court, if the 
employees “were authorized to access their work laptops and to download 
files from them, they cannot be liable under the CFAA even if they 
subsequently misused those documents to compete against” the 
company.109 For that reason, even though the employees used the 
company’s information for competitive purposes, the court granted the 
employees’ motion for partial summary judgment on the company’s CFAA 
claims.110 Consequently, relief for the company would have to come in the 
form of a non-CFAA cause of action.111 
Today, a major question surrounding the CFAA is whether the Southern 
District of New York and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania reached the 
correct result. The interpretation adopted by JBCHoldings, that the text of 
the CFAA unambiguously favors a narrow interpretation, appears unfairly 
dismissive.112 In fact, the existence of the circuit split suggests otherwise. 
Regarding Dresser-Rand Co., by relying mostly on case law, it is unclear 
whether the text, legislative history, or both require a narrow 
interpretation.113 As to both cases, a better approach would be to recognize 
the ambiguity and apply the rule of lenity, as well as consult the legislative 
history, to reach the same conclusion. Under either approach, the CFAA 
does not provide a cause of action for violations of a computer-use policy. 
Beginning with the text, as noted above, the CFAA provides a cause of 
action against individuals who access “without authorization” or “exceed[] 
authorized access.”114 Statutory text may be deemed “ambiguous” if “two 
or more reasonable people disagree as to its meaning.”115 Because 
reasonable minds can differ as to the meaning of “without authorization” 
and “exceeds authorized access,” those phrases are ambiguous.  
As to the “without authorization” language, the crux of that phrase lies 
in the definition of “authorization.” Authorization can be defined as “the 
state of being authorized,”116 and “authorize” can mean “to endorse, 
                                                                                                                     
 107. Id. at 620. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 621. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See supra text accompanying notes 93–94. 
 113. See supra notes 101–06 and accompanying text. 
 114. See supra text accompanying notes 11–12. 
 115. JELLUM & HRICIK, supra note 104, at 94 (“Most courts state that statutes are ambiguous 
when two or more reasonable people disagree as to its meaning.”). But cf. Chickasaw Nation v. 
United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001) (emphasis added) (defining ambiguity as where a “statute is 
‘fairly capable’ of two interpretations”); Mayor of Lansing v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 680 
N.W.2d 840, 847 (Mich. 2004) (“[A] provision of the law is ambiguous only if it ‘irreconcilably 
conflict[s]’ with another provision or when it is equally susceptible to more than a single meaning.” 
(second emphasis added) (citation omitted)). 
 116. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 146 (1993). 
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empower, justify, or permit by . . . some recognized or proper authority.”117 
Under the broad interpretation of the CFAA, one may argue that 
“authorization” to access can vary depending on the accesser’s purpose.118 
Under that approach, an employer may authorize an employee to access the 
employer’s database for business purposes; however, that same employer 
may deny authorization to access for personal purposes. In contrast, under 
a narrow reading of the CFAA, one may argue that “authorization” to 
access must be unqualified, and any violation of a policy after having 
accessed under the employer’s authorization is merely a misuse of 
information and not a violation of the CFAA.119 Here, an employee who 
receives a username and password is presumptively authorized to access 
the employer’s database; however, if that employee then impermissibly 
downloads or misappropriates employer information, that employee merely 
misuses the information. Regardless, “authorization” is at least capable of 
two reasonable interpretations,120 and therefore the term is ambiguous.121 
As to the “exceeds authorized access” language, the question is more 
difficult. The CFAA defines the phrase in § 1030(e)(6) as “to access a 
computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter 
information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or 
alter.”122 Under a broad interpretation of the CFAA, one may argue that 
impermissible “obtain[ing] or alter[ing]” is equivalent to misuse.123 In 
contrast, under a narrow interpretation, the definition of “exceeds 
authorized access” only covers “insider hacking,”124 wherein an individual, 
after having permissibly accessed a database, “accesses other information 
as to which he lacks permission.”125 In this sense, “entitled” would be 
                                                                                                                     
 117. Id.; see also United States v. Aleynikov, 737 F. Supp. 2d 173, 191 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(discussing several dictionary definitions of “authorize”). 
 118. See supra text accompanying note 49; see also United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 272 
(5th Cir. 2010) (“Access to a computer and data that can be obtained from that access may be 
exceeded if the purposes for which access has been given are exceeded.” (emphasis added)). 
 119. See supra text accompanying notes 85–86, 89–90. 
 120. Cf. supra note 115 (discussing competing standards for determining ambiguity). 
 121. But see JBCHoldings NY, LLC v. Pakter, 931 F. Supp. 2d 514, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(refusing to declare the CFAA ambiguous). 
 122. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) (2012). 
 123. One could also argue that the term “so” should be construed to mean “in that manner.” 
See United States v. Nosal, 642 F.3d 781, 785–86 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 
2012) (en banc). In that vein, “exceeds authorized access” would refer to the way in which 
information is “obtain[ed] or alter[ed]” which speaks to using (not accessing) information. Id. 
 124. See supra text accompanying note 79. 
 125. JBCHoldings NY, LLC, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 523. For example, an employee, with a 
username and password, would “exceed[] authorized access” if that employee, after permissibly 
accessing the employer’s network, hacked into another employee’s e-mail account or into a 
password-protected folder. 
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synonymous with “authorized,”126 and “entitled so to obtain or alter” may 
simply refer to whether an individual is permitted to access the 
information.127 However, again, both interpretations seem reasonable, and 
the statute is therefore ambiguous. 
Declaring the CFAA ambiguous is a critical determination in 
interpreting the statute narrowly. For one, the rule of lenity will apply, 
requiring courts to strictly construe the CFAA in favor of the defendant.128 
Significantly, the rule of lenity will apply even in civil applications of the 
CFAA.129 Additionally, because the statute is ambiguous, courts will more 
readily consult the legislative history,130 and the legislative history seems to 
conclusively favor a narrow interpretation. 
Looking back to the Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud 
Abuse Act of 1984, wherein 18 U.S.C. § 1030 was originally enacted, the 
House Judiciary Committee expressed its concern for “so-called ‘hackers’ 
who have been able to access (trespass into) both private and public 
systems.”131 In all, the report from House Judiciary Committee mentioned 
some derivation of the word “hack” seven times.132 The Committee was 
especially blunt in stating that “[i]t is noteworthy that section 1030 deals 
with an ‘unauthorized access’ concept of computer fraud rather than the 
mere use of a computer.”133 
Just two years later, Congress enacted the CFAA.134 Here, Congress 
established the “exceeds authorized access” language.135 By including 
“exceeds authorized access” in § 1030(a) and defining that phrase in 
§ 1030(e)(6), Congress removed the prior language from § 1030(a) that 
covered individuals who “having accessed a computer with authorization, 
use[] the opportunity such access provides for purposes to which such 
                                                                                                                     
 126. United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 857 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (“An equally or more 
sensible reading of ‘entitled’ is as a synonym for ‘authorized.’”). 
 127. JBCHoldings NY, LLC, 931 F. Supp. at 523 (“[A]n employee ‘exceeds authorized access’ 
when he has permission to access certain information on a computer, but accesses other information 
as to which he lacks permission.”). 
 128. See supra notes 70–71, 104, 114 and accompanying text. 
 129. See supra note 70. 
 130. See Mayor of Lansing v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 680 N.W.2d 840, 846 (Mich. 2004) 
(“A finding of ambiguity, of course, enables an appellate judge to bypass traditional approaches to 
interpretation and . . . engage in a largely subjective and perambulatory reading of ‘legislative 
history.’”); cf. Martin H. Redish & Matthew B. Arnould, Judicial Review, Constitutional 
Interpretation, and the Democratic Dilemma: Proposing a “Controlled Activism” Alternative, 64 
FLA. L. REV. 1485, 1525 (2012) (noting the plain meaning rule “dictates that when words are 
linguistically unambiguous, an interpreter may not resort to external sources to contradict the 
inexorable implications of that unambiguous meaning” (emphasis added)).  
 131. H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 10 (1984). 
 132. Id. at 10–11, 21. 
 133. Id. at 20 (emphasis added). 
 134. See supra note 7. 
 135. See supra text accompanying notes 11–12. 
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authorization does not extend.”136 In its report, the Senate Judiciary 
Committee illustrated its understanding of “exceeds authorized access.”137 
The Committee noted that an employee might “exceed[] authorized 
access” if “while authorized to use a particular computer in one 
department, [he] briefly exceeds his authorized access and peruses data 
belonging to [a] department that he is not supposed to look at.”138 The 
Committee referred to the “exceeds authorized access” language as 
covering “insider cases,”139 much like the Ninth Circuit referred to “insider 
hacking.”140 
It should be noted that the report from the Senate Judiciary Committee 
accompanying the 1996 amendment hints that misuses of information may 
be covered by the CFAA. Specifically, in discussing the penalties for 
violating § 1030(a)(2)(C), the report mentions that the CFAA covers 
“misusing information,” as well as theft-related issues.141 Without more, 
theft of information seems like a misuse issue, not an access issue. But, the 
Committee clarified that “[t]he crux of the offense under subsection 
1030(a)(2)(C), however, is the abuse of a computer to obtain the 
information.”142 Therefore, the CFAA does not cover the actual offense; 
rather, it covers the unauthorized access that precedes the offense.143 
Pending legislation also seeks to narrow the reach of the CFAA by 
removing the “exceeds authorized access” language and defining “access 
without authorization” to include only access, and not use.144 This 
proposed amendment could indicate that Congress understands the current 
language to be broad; therefore, Congress wishes to alter the plain 
meaning. In contrast, the amendment could indicate that Congress 
understands the text to be narrow; however, Congress nonetheless wishes 
                                                                                                                     
 136. See S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 9 (1986). 
 137. See id. at 7. Here, the Committee was discussing whether to include the “exceeds 
authorized access” language in § 1030(a)(3). Id. While the Committee ultimately decided to exclude 
that language from (a)(3), id., “exceeds authorized access” can be found in §§ 1030(a)(1), (a)(2), 
and (a)(4). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 7–8 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 140. See supra text accompanying note 78–79. 
 141. S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 7–8 (1996). 
 142. Id. 
 143. These statements are found in a broader discussion of what is meant by “obtaining 
information” within the definition of “exceeds authorized access.” Id. The Committee noted that 
“obtain[]” only includes “mere observation.” Id. at 7 (quoting S. REP. NO. 99-432 at 6–7 (1986)). In 
that sense, “obtain” is akin to “access,” i.e., an individual “obtains” a file by merely accessing that 
file. 
 144. See Aaron’s Law Act of 2013, S. 1196, 113th Cong. § 2; Aaron’s Law Act of 2013, H.R. 
2454, 113th Cong. § 2; see also Zoe Lofgren & Ron Wyden, Introducing Aaron’s Law, a 
Desperately Needed Reform of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, WIRED (Mar. 5, 2014, 9:30 
PM), http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/06/aarons-law-is-finally-here/ (discussing CFAA’s flaws 
and whether Aaron’s Law will improve the CFAA). 
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to add clarity to combat prosecutorial abuse. While the pending legislation 
provides little guidance on that point, the weight of the legislative history 
indicates that the CFAA prohibits only unauthorized access, not 
unauthorized use.145  
Thus, the Southern District of New York in JBCHoldings NY, LLC and 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Dresser-Rand Co. correctly 
interpreted the CFAA narrowly. Whereas these two decisions reach the 
correct result, each court’s rationale leaves something to be desired. In 
addressing whether the CFAA provides a cause of action for misuses of 
information, a better method would be to declare the statute ambiguous. 
Because the CFAA is ambiguous, courts will more readily consult the 
legislative history that favors a narrow interpretation. Where that much is 
unclear, the rule of lenity will require that courts interpret the CFAA 
narrowly in favor of a criminal or civil defendant. 
Therefore, when the issue inevitably reaches the Second and Third 
Circuits, those courts should interpret the CFAA narrowly and hold that 
there is no cause of action under the CFAA for misusing electronic 
information. Additionally, in light of a recent trend favoring a narrow 
interpretation,146 the Second and Third Circuits will likely follow suit. 
Soon enough, in both New York and Philadelphia, there will be no cause 





                                                                                                                     
 145. See supra text accompanying notes 78–79, 82, 101–02.  
 146. See Thomas E. Booms, Note, Hacking into Federal Court: Employee “Authorization” 
Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 543, 565–67 (2011) 
(discussing the trend favoring a narrow interpretation in both the Second and Third Circuits); see 
also supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text (noting that neither the Second nor Third Circuit 
has addressed whether the narrow interpretation should control at the appellate level and that the 
Second Circuit may soon address the issue). 
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